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If official interventions convey private information useful for price discovery in foreign-exchange
markets, then they should have value as a forecast of near-term exchange-rate movements.  Using
a set of standard criteria, we show that approximately 60 percent of all U.S. foreign-exchange interventions
between 1973 and 1995 were successful in this sense.  This percentage, however, is no better than
random.  U.S. intervention sales and purchases of foreign exchange were incapable of forecasting
dollar appreciations or depreciations.  U.S. interventions, however, were associated with more moderate
dollar movements in a manner consistent with leaning against the wind, but only about 22 percent
of all U.S. interventions conformed to this pattern.  We also found that the larger the size of an intervention,
the greater was its probability of success, although some interventions were inefficiently large.  Other
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The Federal Reserve as an Informed Foreign-Exchange Trader: 1973 - 1995 
There is no evidence, nor does anybody here [in the FOMC] 
believe that there is any evidence, to confirm that sterilized 
intervention does anything. 
Alan Greenspan, FOMC Transcripts, 3 October 2000, p. 14 
1.  Introduction 
In mid-1973, shortly after the onset of generalized floating, the United States started 
intervening in the foreign-exchange market, buying or selling foreign currencies in an effort to 
influence dollar exchange rates.  By 1995, however, the United States had all but abandoned 
these operations.  The evidence over the intervening years suggested that intervention was more 
of a hindrance to good policy than a contribution.  Starting in the late 1980s, Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) participants increasingly questioned the effectiveness of 
intervention.  They believed that if intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-
or-miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it.  This stricture, however, 
implied that intervention did not afford the Federal Reserve an instrument with which to 
systematically affect exchange rates independent of monetary policy.  Intervention could 
interfere with the FOMC’s domestic policy objectives.  Moreover the impetus for U.S. 
intervention after 1985 came largely from the U.S. Treasury, which is primarily responsible for 
intervention in the United States.  Despite having separate legal authority for intervention, the 
Federal Reserve System found that it could not easily avoid participating in Treasury initiated 
operations.  Under these circumstances, the FOMC feared, intervention must weaken confidence 
in the System’s commitment to price stability, which at the time the committee was avidly 
attempting to strengthen (Broaddus and Goodfriend 1996, Goodfriend 2010, Bordo, Humpage, 
and Schwartz 2010b).     
While many other advanced countries followed suite, intervention operations never 
entirely ended.  The Japanese Ministry of Finance, for example, undertook frequent—and at 
times massive—operations between 1991 and 2004 with an eye toward limiting the yen’s 
appreciation against the dollar (Ito 2003, 2005, 2007).  The United States, for its own part, has 
participated in two operations against Japanese yen and one against euros since the summer of 
1995.  The recent global financial turmoil has encouraged a limited resurgence of intervention.   
Japan has again intervened, once with U.S. cooperation.  The Swiss National Bank has also 
intervened heavily in an effort to limit the franc’s appreciation against the euro and the dollar.  
Emerging markets, including Brazil, Chile, and Israel, have also intervened.  The often 
heightened volatility of exchange rates since 2007 has prompted some economists to recommend 
the limited use of intervention (Neely 2011).   
This paper reviews the U.S. experience from 1973 through 1995 in search of lessons 
pertinent to any modern re-evaluation of intervention policy.  Following Humpage (1999, 2000), 
we construct reasonable success criteria based on the correspondence between interventions and 
daily exchange-rate movements.  We count the number of observed successes under each 
criterion and assess whether that count exceeds the number that might occur randomly given the 
near-martingale nature of daily exchange-rate changes.  A high success count indicates that 
intervention has value as a forecast of near-term exchange-rate patterns and implies that 
intervention conveys information useful for price discovery.  We also investigate whether 4 
 
various characteristics of an intervention, such as its size, frequency, or coordination, can 
increase its probability of success.   
We find that 60 percent of all U.S. interventions between 1973 and 1995 were successful 
under our criteria—a percentage that is no better than random.  This result occurs because U.S. 
purchases and sales of foreign exchange show no systematic correspondence with dollar 
depreciations or appreciations, respectively.  U.S. interventions, however, often did accompany 
same-day moderations of dollar exchange-rate movements in a manner broadly consistent with 
leaning against the wind.  While these successes were generally greater than random, they 
accounted for less than one-fourth of all U.S. interventions, and were not universally robust 
across time periods and currencies.  We also found that the larger the size of an intervention, the 
greater is its probability of success, although an intervention can be inefficiently large.  Other 
characteristics of interventions, notably coordination, seem to have had no apparent influence on 
our success rates.   
This paper proceeds as follows:  The next section draws a key distinction between 
sterilized and nonsterilized interventions and discusses the theoretical channels through which 
sterilized intervention might operate.  Section 3 explains our three success criteria, our data, and 
our counting methods.  Section 4 evaluates our success counts under the assumption that 
successes are hypergeometric random variables.  Section 5 checks the robustness of our results 
across various subperiods.  Section 6 uses probit regressions to see if various characteristics of an 
intervention alter the probability of success.  Section 7 concludes with some discussion of our 
results and a few comparisons to earlier work.   
2. Background 
Except for the instruments involved, the mechanics of an intervention are similar to those 
of an open-market operation, and like an open-market operation, foreign-exchange interventions 
have the potential to alter bank reserves.  The Federal Reserve—like most large central banks—
routinely sterilizes the impact of all U.S. foreign-exchange operations on the monetary base 
(Neely 2001, Lecourt and Raymond 2006).  Sterilization prevents foreign-exchange transactions 
from interfering with the domestic objectives of monetary policy.   
In contrast to the sterilized variety, nonsterilized intervention, which alters the monetary 
base, is essentially equivalent to introducing an exchange-rate target into a central bank’s 
reaction function.  While presenting the central bank with an additional policy target, non-
sterilized intervention fails to offer an additional independent instrument with which to attain 
that target.  If an undesirable movement in the exchange rate should stem from a domestic 
monetary shock, then counteracting it through purchases of foreign exchange is wholly 
redundant to doing so through traditional open-market operations (see Bonser-Neal et al. 1998, 
Humpage 1999).
1  On the other hand, if the initial, underlying shock to the exchange rate is 
something other than domestic and monetary in nature, then attempting to achieve an exchange-
rate objective through either nonsterilized intervention or traditional open-market operations can 
interfere with the attainment of a central bank’s domestic policy goals.   If, for example, the 
dollar depreciates vis à vis a foreign currency because the foreign central bank tightens its 
monetary policy, then conducting nonsterilized intervention to stabilize the dollar lowers 
inflation below the Federal Reserve’s desired level.   
Sterilized intervention is useful to policy makers only to the extent that it provides a 
mechanism for systematically affecting exchange rates independent of their domestic monetary 5 
 
policy objectives.  Theoretically, sterilized intervention might influence exchange rates through a 
portfolio-balance channel, an inventory-adjustment channel, an expectations channel or a 
coordination mechanism.
2  
A portfolio-balance channel should offer central banks a way to routinely affect exchange 
rates without interfering with their domestic monetary-policy objectives.  Sterilized intervention 
has no effect on the monetary base, but it alters the currency composition of publically held 
government securities.  Specifically, the act of sterilizing an intervention increases outstanding 
debt denominated in the currency that central banks are selling relative to debt denominated in 
the currency that central banks are buying.  If risk-averse asset holders view securities in 
different currency denominations as imperfect substitutes, they will hold the relatively more 
abundant asset in their portfolio only if the expected rate of return on this asset compensates 
them for the perceived risks of doing so.
3  Their initial reluctance to hold the relatively more 
abundant security forces a spot depreciation of the currency that central banks are selling relative 
to the currency that they are buying.  The spot depreciation relative to the exchange rate’s 
longer-term expected value then raises the anticipated rate of return on the now more-abundant 
securities and compensates asset holders for the perceived increase in risk.
4  Unfortunately, most 
empirical studies do not find that intervention affects exchange rates through a portfolio-balance 
mechanism (Edison 1993).  Typically, the relevant coefficients in these studies are either 
statistically or quantitatively insignificant, or unstable across time periods and currencies.  A 
notable exception is Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) who find support for a portfolio-balance 
channel.   In general, central banks put little stock in this mechanism (Neely 2007).   
A variation of the standard portfolio-balance channel, the inventory-adjustment 
mechanism, describes how intervention might affect exchange rates in the very short run (Evan 
and Lyons 2001, 2005, Lyons 2001).  These models focus on the role of foreign-exchange 
dealers, who, as market makers, stand ready to buy and sell foreign exchange.  These same 
dealers typically do not hold sizable open positions in a foreign currency, especially overnight 
(Cheung and Chinn 2001).  They will try to distribute their unwanted currency holdings among 
other dealers and eventually among their commercial customers.  Since different currencies are 
not perfect substitutes in the dealers’ portfolios, this inventory-adjustment process resembles a 
portfolio-balance-like mechanism at the micro level.  Evans and Lyons (2001, 2005) claim 
evidence of both temporary—dealer-to-dealer inventory reshuffling—and permanent—dealer-to-
customer—portfolio-balance effects.  The permanent component of this model, however, is at 
odds with the macro literature.     
Alternatively, sterilized intervention might exert some influence over foreign-exchange 
rates by affecting market expectations about future exchange-rate changes.  Unlike the portfolio-
balance mechanism, an expectations channel does not alter the fundamental determinants of 
exchange rates, but changes perceptions of those fundamentals.  This may quickly shift exchange 
rates to an alternative path, but one that is still consistent with those unchanged fundamentals.   
For the expectations channel to work, information must be costly and asymmetrically 
distributed, and monetary authorities must have private information about exchange rates that 
they can convey to the market through their interventions (Baillie, Humpage, and Osterberg 
2000).  Survey evidence does suggest that information is asymmetrically distributed (Cheung 
and Chinn 2001).  Large foreign-exchange traders have better information than smaller traders 
and transfer that information through their trades.  Any traders—including monetary 6 
 
authorities—that others suspect of having superior information could affect prices, if market 
participants observed their trades.   
Should we expect central banks to routinely possess a significant informational advantage 
over private-market participants?  Mussa (1981) initially suggested that a central bank might 
signal unanticipated changes in monetary policy through its interventions.  This signal would 
have credence because the monetary authority will incur a capital loss on its foreign-exchange 
position if it fails to carry through with its policy signal.  Because of this condition, the signaling 
channel does not offer monetary authorities a mechanism through which they can routinely affect 
exchange rates independent of their monetary policies.   
Monetary authorities, however, often claim to intervene when they view current 
exchange rates as being inconsistent with market fundamentals, implying that they have an 
information advantage beyond prospective changes in monetary policy.  Central banks have 
large staffs that gather and analyze data, and they maintain ongoing informational relationships 
with major banks.  Through their frequent contacts with market participants, central banks can 
aggregate the private information of individual traders and disseminate this information through 
intervention (Popper and Montgomery 2001).  If monetary authorities routinely have better 
broad-based information than other market participants, then their interventions should 
accurately predict near-term exchange-rate movements.   
In extreme cases of information imperfections, when a substantial portion of market 
participants base their trades on extrapolations of past exchange-rate movements, exchange rates 
might remain misaligned, even if more-informed traders feel that current exchange rates are 
inappropriate.  In the presence of strong bandwagon effects or collective-action problems, 
informed traders may have recently lost money and withdrawn temporarily from the market, 
causing the misalignment to persist.  In such cases, sterilized intervention might offer a 
coordinating signal to those traders that react to fundamentals (Sarno and Taylor, 2001 and Reitz 
and Taylor, 2008).  This coordination channel does not require that a central bank necessarily 
have better information than the market.  The signal bolsters traders’ confidence about their own 
expectations and encourages them to take positions.  It does seem to require, however, that 
monetary authorities lack credibility.  A credible central bank could simply announce that the 
exchange rate is misaligned (Reitz and Taylor 2008).   
In the next section, we test whether U.S. interventions had value as a forecast of 
subsequent exchange-rate movements.  As such, our tests seem consistent with an expectations 
channel or, possibly, a coordination mechanism.   
3.  Success Counts 
We evaluate the success of U.S. foreign-exchange operations using two specific criteria 
and a general criterion that incorporates the first two.  In all of the definitions that follow, It 
designates U.S. intervention on day t, with positive (negative) values being sales (purchases) of 
foreign exchange.  St is the opening (9:00 a.m.) spot bid for foreign exchange in the New York 
market on day t measured in foreign-currency units per U.S. dollar, and ΔSt = St+1 – St.  The 
change in the exchange rate from the opening on day t to the opening on day t+1 brackets U.S. 
interventions on day t.
5  The target exchange rate is either German marks per dollar or Japanese 
yen per dollar, and It consists only of the corresponding intervention, that is, dollars against 
German marks or dollars against Japanese yen.   7 
 
Our first binomial success criterion (SC1) counts an official U.S. sale or purchase of 
foreign exchange on a particular day as a success (SC1=1) if the dollar appreciates or depreciates, 
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Our second success criterion (SC2) scores an intervention as a success (SC2=1) if the 
United States sells foreign exchange and the dollar continues to depreciate, but does so by less 
than over the previous day.  Likewise, this criterion counts intervention as a success if the United 
States buys foreign exchange and the dollar continues to appreciate, but does so by less than over 
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Our general success criterion (SC3) incorporates SC1 and SC2.  Accordingly, an 
intervention sale of foreign exchange on a particular day is successful (SC3=1) if the dollar 
appreciates or if it depreciates by less than on the previous day.  A corresponding rule holds for 
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We measure success over a single day, which some may find unduly restrictive 
(Goodhart and Hesse 1993, Fatum and Hutchison 2002).  Despite the narrow window, the chance 
that we might fail to count an intervention as successful because the appropriate exchange-rate 
movement occurred beyond the opening on day t+1 seems remote.  Chang and Taylor (1998), 
Chueng and Chinn (2001), and Dominguez (2003), among others, suggest that exchange markets 
begin to respond to intervention within minutes or hours, not days.  Likewise, a majority of 
central bank officials in Neely’s (2001) survey contended that exchange rates reflect the full 
effects of intervention within hours.  Alternatively, by keeping the window narrow, we may 
count an intervention as a success even though the exchange-rate change that led us to that 
conclusion subsequently disappears.  Opening the event window beyond a single day to limit this 
problem, however, quickly causes overlap among interventions, making inferences about the 
likelihood of an intervention’s success impossible.   
We assume, as in Dominguez (2003, p. 34), that U.S. monetary authorities base a 
decision to intervene on day t only on past information about exchange rates.  We believe this to 
be an accurate characterization of how U.S. policy makers generally reach their decision to 
intervene, although the Desk may sometimes adjust the amount of an intervention in response to 
market reactions (Neely 2001, Baillie and Osteberg 1997).  If exchange-rate changes and 
interventions are jointly determined on day t, our counts could contain a bias (Neely 2005).   8 
 
Although we do not model a specific transmission mechanism for intervention, we 
assume that intervention operates through an expectations channel.  We are testing to see if U.S. 
monetary authorities have an informational advantage that they impart to the market through 
their interventions (ala Popper and Montgomery 2001).  If central-bank intervention does indeed 
impart new information to the market, private traders will immediately incorporate it into their 
exchange-rate quotes.  This information may be positive; that is, the market may interpret the 
intervention in the manner that the central bank intends.  Alternatively, this information may be 
negative; that is, the market may react to an intervention in the opposite manner than the central 
bank desires.  Our tests look to uncover this.   
4.  Evaluation 
Following Henriksson and Merton (1981) and Merton (1981), we evaluate our success 
count under the assumption that the number of successes is a hypergeometric random variable.  
The hypergeometric distribution seems appropriate because it does not require individual 
interventions to be independent events and does not depend on a presumed probability of an 
individual success.  To apply the Henriksson and Merton methodology, we must consider 
intervention sales and purchases of foreign exchange separately.   
Our null hypothesis compares the actual and the expected success counts.  We reject the 
null and conclude that intervention has positive forecast value if the success count exceeds the 
expected number by two standard deviations.  We reject the null and conclude that intervention 
has negative forecast value if the actual number of successes lies below the expected number by 
more than two standard deviations.   If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we conclude that the 
number of successes is not different than a number that could randomly occur given the near 
martingale nature of daily exchange-rate changes.     
This approach also assumes that intervention does not change fundamental 
macroeconomic determinants of exchange rates.  This supposition seems appropriate given that 
the Federal Reserve routinely sterilizes all U.S. interventions and given the lack of evidence that 
sterilized intervention works through a portfolio-balance mechanism.  The failure of this 
assumption to hold would bias our results toward finding a high number of successes in any 
sample.   
Table 1 presents our results for the entire sample period, 2 March 1973 through 19 March 
1997.
6  During these 6,274 business days, the United States intervened on 971 days against 
German marks and on 243 days against Japanese yen.
7  The first intervention against German 
marks took place on 10 July 1973, and the first intervention against Japanese yen followed on 24 
January 1974.  The United States intervened against German marks roughly four times as often 
as it did against Japanese yen.  Roughly 60 percent of U.S. interventions against Japanese yen 
involved purchases of yen, suggesting that the United States often thought that the market 
overpriced the dollar.  Interventions against the German mark were more evenly distributed 
between purchases and sales of marks, with only a slight bias toward mark purchases.  (See, 
however, the discussion of pre-1980 interventions in section 5.)   
The first column in table 1 lists the success criteria for the German marks (top section) 
and Japanese yen (bottom section).  The second column shows official U.S. intervention 
purchases and sales.   Between 2 March 1973 and 19 March 1997, for example, the United States 
sold German marks on 469 days and bought German marks on 502 days.  The next two columns 
of data show intervention successes.  Of the 469 U.S. sales of German marks, 136, or 29.0 9 
 
percent, were successful under criterion SC1; that is, each of these 136 interventions was 
associated with a same-day dollar appreciation.  The next two columns show virtual successes.  
Virtual successes follow the respective success criteria outlined in equations 1 through 3, absent 
any consideration of intervention.  The dollar, for example, appreciated against the German 
mark—whether or not the United States intervened against marks—on 2,951, or 47.0 percent, of 
the 6,274 business days in our sample.   
The final two columns in table 1 refer to the hypergeometric distribution.  If successes are 
hypergeometric random variables, then in a sample of 6,274 observations with a virtual success 
rate of 47.0 percent, we would expect to observe 221 successes in 469 interventions, purely by 
chance.  The observed number of successes, 136, falls more than two standard deviations below 
the expected value, implying that the United States had negative forecast value.  This value is so 
low that market participants, who knew when the United States intervened, could have bet 
against the United States—bought German marks on day t—and made money on average.  From 
an expectations-channel perspective, a U.S. sale of German marks signaled that the dollar would 
depreciate over the same day as the intervention.  Similar results hold for purchases of German 
marks, implying that the United States had negative forecast value in this case too.  The 
corresponding success counts for U.S. official interventions against Japanese yen, however, were 
no different than random.   
In contrast to the results under success criterion SC1, the success counts under SC2, for 
both U.S. interventions against German marks and Japanese yen, are more than two standard 
deviations above their expected values, indicating that U.S. interventions had positive forecast 
value with respect to criterion SC2.  When the dollar is depreciating and the United States sells 
foreign exchange, it is a good bet that the dollar will continue to depreciate, but will do so by less 
than on the day prior to the intervention.  Likewise, when the dollar is appreciating and the 
United States buys foreign exchange, it is a good bet that the dollar will continue to appreciate, 
but will do so by less than on the day prior to the intervention.   
While the successes under criterion SC2 clearly exceed the expected number, the overall 
frequency of this type of success is fairly low.  Only 23 percent of all U.S. interventions against 
German marks and 19 percent of all U.S. interventions against Japanese yen were successful 
under the SC2 criterion.   
The final, general success criterion, SC3, combines SC1 and SC2.  Generally, we expect 
that approximately 60 percent of all interventions will be successful under at least one of our 
success criteria purely by chance.  (See the virtual counts under SC3 in table 1.)  The total 
number of actual successes under SC3 is—in all but one case—no better than random.  The 
exception is the total for U.S. sales of German marks, which falls more than two standard 
deviations below the expected number.   
5.  Robustness  
We repeated our counting analysis for various subperiods as a robustness check.  We start 
by dividing the sample into two parts: The first broad subperiod runs from 2 March 1973, when 
generalized floating was just beginning, through 17 April 1981, when the Reagan administration 
announced its minimalist intervention strategy.  The second broad subperiod extends from 20 
April 1981, the start of the minimalist period, through 19 March 1997, the end of our sample 
period.  Next, we divided each of these two subperiods further.   10 
 
Table 2 summarizes our results for the various subperiods, with N and P indicating that 
the number of actual successes for a specific criterion was, respectively, two standard deviations 
below or above the expected number and suggesting, respectively, that intervention had negative 
or positive forecast value for a designated criterion.
8  An R in table 2 indicates that the observed 
number of successes was no different than the number that we expect purely by chance.    
The table cautions that overall conclusions about intervention are not necessarily robust 
across time periods or across currencies within any time period.  Nevertheless, some relatively 
persistent patterns stand out:  First, U.S. intervention in German marks prior to 17 April 1981 
universally had negative forecast value (N) with respect to criterion SC1 and universally had 
positive forecast value (P) with respect to criterion SC2.  Often during this time period—certainly 
before 15 September 1977—the United States feared that private traders might interpret an 
intervention as a sign that the dollar was fundamentally weak and that market participants might 
bet against the System’s interventions.
9  Our results validate this concern.  To avoid such an 
adverse response, the United States typically transacted in small amounts through the agency of a 
commercial bank in the broker’s market.  Operating in this manner kept the System anonymous.  
In addition, Green (1984, #127), who once managed U.S. foreign-exchange operations, suggests 
that over this time period, U.S. policy makers usually only hoped to smooth exchange-rate 
movements; that is, the United States usually cared more about results under SC2 than under SC1.  
Moreover, despite what the numbers of purchases and sales might suggest, the United States 
typically sought only to moderate dollar depreciations—not appreciations.  The United States, 
however, often financed its foreign-exchange sales through swap drawings and had to repurchase 
the dollars to repay the swaps fairly quickly.  These repurchases may have had no exchange-rate 
objective, other than to avoid creating market disorder in the process.   
Second, U.S. interventions against Japanese yen prior to the Plaza Accord—with few 
exceptions—seem unsuccessful under each of our three criteria.  Prior to the Plaza Accord, 
however, the United States rarely intervened against Japanese yen.  With so few observations, 
drawing firm conclusions about the success of U.S. interventions against Japanese yen may be 
risky.  (A similar caveat applies to the interventions against German marks over the 20 April 
1981 through 29 March 1985 minimalist period.)  Nevertheless, the counts do not seem 
supportive of an active intervention strategy 
Third, the large U.S. interventions associated with the Plaza and Louvre Accords (1 April 
1985 through 29 April 1988) and with the U.S. Treasury led interventions of the very late 1980s 
and early 1990s, had overall success counts that were not obviously different than previous 
episodes.  Economists have often regarded the interventions following the Plaza and Louvre 
accords as highly successful.  The failure to find positive forecast value under SC1 suggests that 
U.S. interventions could not have maintained a target-zone arrangement once the dollar reached 
a band.  We do, however, find evidence of positive forecast value under SC2 for U.S. purchases 
and sales of German marks during the Plaza and Louvre period, for U.S. sales of Japanese yen 
during both of the final two subperiods, and for U.S. purchases of yen in the last period.     
Fourth, U.S. interventions lack positive forecast value under success criterion, SC3, 
during every subperiods portrayed in table 2.  Our overall finding that fewer than 60 percent of 
U.S. interventions had positive forecast value seems consistent across time periods and 
currencies.   
 11 
 
6.  Conditional Probability 
Tables 1 and 2 describe the unconditional probabilities of success under our three criteria.  
U.S. monetary authorities, however, conceivably could have increased their odds of success by 
altering the way in which they undertook an intervention.  Tables 3 through 6 present a series of 
probit regressions that attempt to describe how various conditioning variables affected the 
outcome.  Tables 3 and 5 show estimates for only U.S. interventions against German marks and 
Japanese yen, respectively, over our entire sample period—2 March 1973 through 19 March 
1997.  Tables 4 and 6 consider shorter sample periods, which allow us to include, respectively, 
published data on German and Japanese intervention in our probit regressions.  Data on German 
intervention against U.S. dollars are publicly available between 1 January 1976 and 29 
December 1995, and data on Japanese intervention against U.S. dollars are publicly available 
between 1 January 1991 and 19 March 1997.  The dependent variable in all cases is our general 
success criterion, SC3, since we do not know whether the United States was pursuing criterion 
SC1 or SC2, at any particular time.  The independent variables in the various probit regressions 
appear in first columns of tables 3 through 6.  We drop nonintervention days from the sample 
and run the regression only over observations containing intervention.   
Although a few variables appear to be statistically significant in specific cases, the only 
variable that consistently explains the likelihood of success across all of the estimates in tables 3 
through 6 is the dollar amount of a U.S. intervention.  The results for those other variables that 
sometimes appear significant are either not robust to changes in the sample size (necessary to 
include foreign intervention) or across currencies, or they prove collinear with the amount of 
U.S. intervention.   
The United States, for example, often undertook intervention in concert with the 
Bundesbank or the Bank of Japan.  A coordination dummy is significant for the German mark at 
time t, but lowers the likelihood of success (table 4).  German intervention at t, however, appears 
collinear with the amount of U.S. intervention.  The United States spends more on average when 
Germany has intervened ($113.4 million) than when Germany has not entered the market ($89.1 
million).  At time t+1, however, U.S.-Bundesbank coordination is not significant.  When we add 
the amount of German intervention at either time t or at time t+1 to U.S. intervention at time t to 
construct a new amount variable consisting of the total amount of intervention (U.S. and/or 
German), the amount is not significant.  Given the time difference between Frankfurt and New 
York and given the timing convention in this paper, German intervention at t and t+1 overlaps a 
U.S. intervention on day t, so we should consider both measures of intervention.  Similarly, the 
coordination dummy for Japanese intervention on day t is significant and suggests that 
coordinated intervention increases the likelihood of success.  All but one U.S. intervention over 
this period, however, are coordinated with Japan on day t, so the variable adds virtually no 
additional information.  Given the time difference between Tokyo and New York and given our 
timing conventions, comparing Japanese intervention at t+1 with SC3 at time t seems 
appropriate, but when we do so, the coefficient suggests that coordinated intervention lowers the 
likelihood of success.  When we instead add the amount of Japanese intervention at either time t 
or time t+1 to U.S. intervention again creating a new series of total U.S. and/or Japanese 
intervention, the amount is not statistically significant.   
The dummy variables that consider the sign on the previous day’s intervention—lagged 
same-type intervention and lagged different-type intervention—are both significant in the 12 
 
German mark case (tables 3 and 4), but not in the Japanese yen case (tables 5 and 6).  For the 
German mark case, these variables seem collinear with the amount of U.S. intervention.   
Figure 1 uses the coefficient estimates for the amount of U.S. intervention (exclusive of 
foreign-intervention variables) from tables 3 and 5 to estimate how the probability of success 
responds to the size of intervention.  Over the entire sample, the unconditional probability of a 
successful intervention against German marks using the SC3 criterion is 57 percent, while the 
probability of a virtual success is slightly higher, around 60 percent.  Based on our estimates, a 
U.S. intervention of $110 million against German marks has a 60 percent probability of being 
successful.  Over the entire sample period, 2 March 1973 through 19 March 1997, fewer than 25 
percent of U.S. interventions against German marks were greater than $100 million.  The mean 
intervention in our sample was $80 million, while the median intervention was only $31 million.  
The largest intervention against German marks amounted to $950 million.  This amount is more 
than twice as large as was necessary to virtually guarantee success, about $400 million, and 
seems inefficiently large.   
Similarly, large interventions against Japanese yen increased the probability of success.  
Over the entire sample, the unconditional probability of success (SC3) for interventions against 
Japanese yen was 65 percent, somewhat higher than the probability of a virtual success at 
roughly 60 percent.  We find that a U.S. intervention against Japanese yen of $187 million had a 
65 percent probability of success.  Over the entire sample, the average U.S. intervention against 
Japanese yen was $131 million, and the median intervention against Japanese yen equaled only 
$90 million.  The largest intervention against Japanese yen amounted to $800 million.  As is the 
case with U.S. intervention against German marks, this amount seems inefficiently large.  We 
estimate that a U.S. intervention of roughly $510 million is sufficient to virtually guarantee 
success against Japanese yen.   
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
Between the inception of generalized floating in 1973 and the FOMC’s abandonment of 
its active intervention policy in 1995, approximately 60 percent of all official U.S. transactions in 
the foreign-exchange market were associated with a same-day exchange-rate movement that U.S. 
authorities could have easily deemed a success.  Given the near-martingale nature of exchange-
rate changes, this percentage is no different than what we expect to find purely by chance.  
Overall, U.S. intervention lacked value as a forecast of near-term exchange-rate movements.   
This general result, however, combines two very different outcomes:  U.S. intervention 
sales and purchases of foreign exchange were generally incapable of forecasting dollar 
appreciations or depreciations, respectively.  This negative result is robust across all time periods 
and both of the currencies that we considered, and prior to 1981, private-market participants 
could have profitably bet against U.S. interventions in German marks.  In sharp contrast, we do 
find that U.S. intervention was associated with more moderate movements in the dollar in a 
manner consistent with leaning against the wind.  A private trader observing U.S. intervention 
usually could have predicted this outcome.  Neely and Weller (1997) and LeBaron (1999) cite 
leaning-against-the-wind intervention strategies as a reason for their finding that intervention 
improves the profitability of technical trading rules.  That said, only about 22 percent of all U.S. 
interventions conformed to this pattern, and the result—while strong—is not universal across 
every time period and currency.   13 
 
Our findings do not seem to reflect a purely U.S. phenomenon.  Using like techniques, 
Chaboud and Humpage (2005) and Humpage and Ragnartz (2005) found similar results for 
Japanese interventions between 1991 and 2004 and Swedish interventions between 1993 and 
2002, respectively.   
While our criteria are consistent with the notion of a successful intervention, they are not 
the only conceivable criteria.  Greene (1984 #129) suggests some other criteria—for example 
wide bid-ask spreads—that U.S. monetary authorities have viewed as consistent with market 
disorder.  Moreover, intervention, or even the threat of intervention, can affect market 
expectations and actions in ways that such criteria cannot easily capture.  Galati, Melick, and 
Micu (2005), for example, investigate how the higher moments of market expectations, which 
they derive from the distribution of option prices, respond to intervention.   
We also found some evidence that the likelihood of success—measured broadly (SC3)—
increased with the amount of intervention.  Large U.S. interventions may convey private 
information better than small transactions.  Our analysis suggests, however, that an intervention 
above approximately $400 million against German marks or $500 million against Japanese yen 
virtually guaranteed success.  The three percent of all U.S. interventions that exceeded this 
amount were inefficiently large.   
We did not find evidence that coordinated intervention increased the likelihood of 
success.  The empirical evidence on coordination seems mixed.  Humpage (1999) found that 
coordination increased the probability of success by roughly 20 percent during the Louvre period 
(1987-1990).  Dominquez and Frankel (1993a 1993b) also found in favor of coordination.  
Humpage and Osterberg (1992), however, found that unilateral U.S. interventions were more 
effective than coordinated interventions between 1983 and 1990.  Chaboud and Humpage (2005) 
found only weak evidence that coordination increased the probability of success for Japanese 
interventions against dollars between 1991 and 2004.  The importance of coordination may be 
situational.   
Also controversial is the relative importance of secrecy to an intervention’s effectiveness.  
Given that intervention often operates through an expectations channel, secrecy may seem 
counterproductive, but Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) present theoretical 
models in which secrecy contributes to an intervention’s success.  Dominguez and Frankel 
(1993a), Hung (1997), Chiu (2003), and Beine and Bernal (2007) also discuss various reasons 
for maintaining secrecy.  Prior to the late 1970s, the System usually operated covertly.  
Thereafter, the System usually operated openly.  In comparing our results across time periods 
consisting of various degrees of secrecy, we find no reason to believe that secrecy is important 
for success.   
  Overall our analysis of the U.S. experience with sterilized foreign-exchange intervention 
between 1973 and 1997 cautions against a return to an active intervention policy.  Our results 
suggest that U.S. policymakers did not routinely have private information useful for price 
discovery in the foreign-exchange market.  Sterilized intervention seemed more of a hit-or-miss 
phenomenon than a sure bet.  Chairman Greenspan’s observation, cited at the head of this paper, 




INTERVENTION  VIRTUAL  EXPECTED  STANDARD 
TOTAL  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  DEVIATION 
German Marks   #  #  percent  #  percent #  # 
Observations:  6274 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  469  136  29.0  2951  47.0  220.6  8 
buy marks  502  192  38.2  3007  47.9  240.6  9 
total  971  328  33.8 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  469  117  24.9  820  13.1  61.30  4 
buy marks  502  110  21.9  807  12.9  64.57  4 
total  971  227  23.4 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  469  253  53.9  3771  60.1  282  12 
buy marks  502  302  60.2  3814  60.8  305  13 




sell yen  94  47  50.0  3000  47.8  45  5 
buy yen  149  63  42.3  2836  45.2  67  5 
total  243  110  45.3 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  94  19  20.2  740  11.8  11  1 
buy yen  149  28  18.8  829  13.2  20  2 
total  243  47  19.3 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  94  66  70.2  3740  59.6  56  6 
buy yen  149  92  61.7  3665  58.4  87  7 
total  243  158  65.0 




SUCCESS CRITERION:  SC1  SC1  SC2  SC2  SC3  SC3   SC1  SC1  SC2  SC2  SC3  SC3 
sell/buy foreign exchange:  sell   buy  sell  buy  sell  buy  sell  buy  sell buy sell  buy  sell  buy  sell  buy 
2 March 73 ‐ 19 March 97:  469  502  N  N  P  P  N  R  94  149  R  R  P  P  R  R 
2 March 73 ‐ 17 April 81:  391  348  N  N  P  P  N  R  11  31  R  R  R  P  R  R 
2 March 73 ‐ 14 September 77:  161  176  N  N  P  P  N  R  0  2  (none)  R  (none)  R  (none)  R 
15 September 77 ‐ 5 October 79:  175  58  N  N  P  P  R  N  10  19  R  N  R  P  R  R 
8 October 79 ‐ 17 April 81:  55  114  N  N  P  P  R  R  1  10  R  R  R  R  R  R 
20 April 81 ‐ 19 March 97:  78  154  R  R  P  P  R  R  83  118  R  R  P  P  R  R 
20 April 81 ‐ 29 March 85:  1  24  N  N  R  P  N  R  0  11  (none)  R  (none)  P  (none)  R 
1 April 85 ‐ 29 April 88:  33  19  R  R  P  P  R  R  52  20  R  R  P  R  R  R 
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TABLE 3: DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS: U.S. INTERVENTION AGAINST GERMAN MARKS 
Constant  Coefficient  Log  Likelihood




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value)  0.107  0.001  ‐659.6  6.99 
2.18  2.60 
             buy foreign exchange (dummy)  0.099  0.158 ‐ 661.2  3.83 
1.71  1.96 
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy)  0.018  0.329 ‐ 654.8  16.44 
0.32  4.05 
             lagged different‐type intervention (dummy)  0.204 ‐ 0.47 ‐ 659.92  6.29 
4.90 ‐ 2.49 
            consecutive interventions (days)  0.116  0.02 ‐ 661.74  2.65 
2.05  1.62 
            elapse since last intervention (days)  0.165  0.003  ‐661.86  2.41 
3.94  1.43 
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TABLE 4: DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS: U.S. & GERMAN INTERVENTION AGAINST MARKS 
Constant  Coefficient Log  Likelihood 




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value)  0.046  0.001 ‐ 489.9  9.43 
0.77  3.01 
             buy foreign exchange (dummy)  0.10  0.12  ‐493.7  1.75 
1.48  1.32 
            coordinated intervention; German on t (dummy)  0.336 ‐ 0.353 ‐ 487.5  14.12 
5.04 ‐ 3.75 
             coordinated intervention; German on t+1 (dummy)  0.216 ‐ 0.130 ‐ 493.6  1.89 
3.48 ‐ 1.37 
             total intervention; U.S. + German at t (abs. value)  0.176 ‐ 0.0001 ‐ 494.48  0.19 
2.95  ‐0.431 
             total intervention; U.S. + German at t+1 (abs. value)  0.167  0.00  ‐494.56  0.03 
2.80 ‐ 0.17 
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy)  0.017  0.289 ‐ 489.8  9.49 
0.26  3.08 
             lagged different‐type intervention (dummy)  0.177 ‐ 0.50 ‐ 492.8  3.57 
3.71 ‐ 1.87 
             consecutive interventions (days)  0.12  0.01 ‐ 494.2  0.75 
1.90  0.87 
             elapse since last intervention (days)  0.14  0.003 ‐ 493.28  2.58 
2.91  1.47 
              compatible change in fed funds or discount rate (dummy)  0.163 ‐ 0.417 ‐ 494.3  0.543 
3.47 ‐ 0.73 
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TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESS: U.S. INTERVENTION AGAINST JAPANESE YEN 
Constant  Coefficient  Log  Likelihood 




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value)  0.232  0.001  ‐156.2  3.40 
2.04  1.79 
             buy foreign exchange (dummy)  0.531 ‐ 0.249 ‐ 156.8  2.13 
3.90 ‐ 1.45 
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy)  0.303  0.151 ‐ 157.5  0.84 
2.67  0.92 
             lagged different‐type intervention (dummy)  not    applicable 
            consecutive interventions (days)  0.391 ‐ 0.01 ‐ 157.9  0.04 
3.27 ‐ 0.19 
            elapse since last intervention (days)  0.347  0.001 ‐ 157.2  1.48 
4.03  1.05 
             compatible change in fed funds or discount rate (dummy)  0.371  5.771 ‐ 157.5 ‐ 157.5 
4.489  0.001 
5 percent  
p-value 
10 percent  
p-value 
Critical Chi‐Square value   1 d.f.  3.84  2.71 
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TABLE 6: DETERMINANTS OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESS: U.S. & JAPANESE INTERVENTION AGAINST YEN 
Constant  Coefficient  Log  Likelihood 




             amount of U.S. intervention  (abs. value) ‐ 0.706  0.005 ‐ 9.6  6.58 
‐1.11  2.09 
            coordinated intervention; Japanes on t (dummy) ‐ 5.703  6.416 ‐ 11.5  2.73 
0.00  0.00 
             coordinated intervention; Japanese on t+1 (dummy)  1.335 ‐ 1.221 ‐ 10.9  3.92 
2.52 ‐ 1.87 
             total intervention with Japanese at t (abs. value) ‐ 0.333  0.001 ‐ 11.0  3.81 
‐0.54  1.63 
             total intervention with Japanese at t+1 (abs. value)  0.794 ‐ 0.0003 ‐ 12.8  0.24 
1.63 ‐ 0.48 
             buy foreign exchange (dummy)  0.97  ‐1.642 ‐ 10.4  5.06 
2.75 ‐ 2.14 
             lagged same‐type intervention (dummy)  0.634 ‐ 0.203 ‐ 12.9  0.06 
2.05 ‐ 0.25 
            lagged different‐type intervention (dummy)  not   applicable 
            consecutive interventions (days)  0.837 ‐ 0.203 ‐ 12.9  0.06 
0.86 ‐ 0.25 
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Appendix:  Supplemental Tables 
This Appendix presents the eight tables summarized in table 2 of the text.  Each of these 
tables corresponds exactly to the methodology use to construct table 1, which we explained in 
section 4 of this paper, except that we estimated each table for a separate subperiod.   
Table A1 covers all U.S. interventions from the inception of generalized floating until the 
United States first abandoned its active intervention policy in 1981.   
Table A1.1 considers intervention during the early dollar float, 1973-1977.  Interventions 
were generally small, conducted primarily by the Federal Reserve through the brokers market to 
maintain anonymity, and generally financed through swap drawings.   
Table A1.2 covers the dollar crisis of 1977 through 1979.  Intervention became larger, 
more frequent, less covert, and with more Treasury involvement.  Swap lines remained a 
predominant source of funds.   
Table A1.3 focuses on the period 1979 to 1981when the dollar was beginning to 
strengthen, and the United States was attempting to acquire a portfolio of foreign exchange to 
avoid using the swap lines.   
Table A2 covers all U.S. interventions from the first minimalist intervention period in 
1981 until the end of our sample in 1997.  The active intervention policy ended in 1995.  These 
interventions were generally larger, more frequent, and more overt.  The United States generally 
financed them from its own portfolio of foreign exchange and split the transactions 50/50 
between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.   
Table A2.1 considers the minimalist intervention policy of the Regan administration, 
1981 – 1985.  The interventions were very infrequent.   
Table A2.2 covers the heavy interventions associated with the Plaza and Louvre accords, 
1985 – 1988.  These were often coordinated with foreign central banks and widely announced.   
Table A2.3 covers the heavy intervention in the late 1980s and early 1990s that prompted 
the FOMC’s concerns about its monetary credibility and the winding down of U.S. intervention 
policy.    
 
TABLE A1: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 2 March 1973 to 17 April 1981 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL EXPECTED STANDARD
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   #  #  percent  #  percent  #  # 
Observations:  2121 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  391  103  26.3  964  45.5  178  7 
buy marks  348  124  35.6  1021  48.1  168  7 
total  739  227  30.7 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  391  100  25.6  296  14.0  55  4 
buy marks  348  82  23.6  276  13.0  45  3 
total  739  182  24.6 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  391  203  51.9  1260  59.4  232  10 
buy marks  348  206  59.2  1297  61.2  213  10 
total  739  409  55.3 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  2121 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  11  7  63.6  976  46.0  5  2 
buy yen  31  11  35.5  910  42.9  13  2 
total  42  18  42.9 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  11  1  9.1  255  12.0  1  0 
buy yen  31  7  22.6  298  14.0  4  1 
total  42  8  19.0 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  11  8  72.7  1231  58.0  6  2 
buy yen  31  18  58.1  1208  57.0  18  3 




TABLE A1.1: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION:  2 March 1973 to 14 September 1977 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent # # 
Observations:  1184 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  161  45  28.0  541  45.7  74  4 
buy marks  176  67  38.1  560  47.3  83  5 
total  337 112  33.2 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  161  34  21.1  151  12.8  21  2 
buy marks  176  45  25.6  163  13.8  24  2 
total  337 79  23.4 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  161  79  49.1  692  58.4  94  6 
buy marks  176  112  63.6  723  61.1  107  7 
total  337 191  56.7 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  1184 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  0  0  na  524  44.3  0  0 
buy yen  2  2  100.0  478  40.4  1  1 
total  2 2  100.0 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  0  0  na  139  11.7  0  0 
buy yen  2  0  na  181  15.3  0  0 
total  2 0  na 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  0  0  na  663  56.0  0  0 
buy yen  2  2  100.0  659  55.7  1  1 
total  2 2  100.0 
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TABLE A1.2: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 15 September 1977 to 5 October 1979 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent  # # 
Observations:  537 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  175  43  24.6  222  41.3  72  4 
buy marks  58  16  27.6  284  52.9  31  3 
total  233 59  25.3 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  175  49  28.0  95  17.7  31  3 
buy marks  58  12  20.7  53  9.9  6  1 
total  233 61  26.2 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  175  92  52.6  317  59.0  103  6 
buy marks  58  28  48.3  337  62.8  36  4 
total  233 120  51.5 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  537 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  10  6  60.0  248  46.2  5  2 
buy yen  19  5  26.3  255  47.5  9  2 
total  29 11  37.9 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  10  1  10.0  72  13.4  1  0 
buy yen  19  6  31.6  68  12.7  2  1 
total  29 7  24.1 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  10  7  70.0  320  59.6  6  2 
buy yen  19  11  57.9  323  60.1  11  3 
total  29 18  62.1 
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TABLE A1.3: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 8 October 1979 to 17 April 1981 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD 
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent  # # 
Observations:  400 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  55  15  27.3  201  50.3  28  3 
buy marks  114  41  36.0  177  44.3  50  4 
total  169 56 33.1 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  55  17  30.9  50  12.5  7  1 
buy marks  114  25  21.9  60  15.0  17  2 
total  169 42 24.9 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  55  32  58.2  251  62.8  35  4 
buy marks  114  66  57.9  237  59.3  68  5 
total  169 98 58.0 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  400 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  1  1  100.0  204  51.0  1  1 
buy yen  10  4  40.0  177  44.3  4  1 
total  11 5 45.5 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  1  0  0.0  44  11.0  0  0 
buy yen  10  1  10.0  49  12.3  1  0 
total  11 1 9.1 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  1  1  100.0  248  62.0  1  0 
buy yen  10  5  50.0  226  56.5  6  2 
total  11 6 54.5 
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TABLE A2: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 20 April 1981 to March 19, 1997 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL EXPECTED STANDARD
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent  # # 
Observations:  4153 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  78  33  42.3  1987  47.8  37  4 
buy marks  154  68  44.2  1986  47.8  74  6 
total  232 101  43.5 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  78  17  21.8  524  12.6  10  1 
buy marks  154  28  18.2  531  12.8  20  2 
total  232 45  19.4 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  78  50  64.1  2511  60.5  47  5 
buy marks  154  96  62.3  2517  60.6  93  7 
total  232 146  62.9 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  4153 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  83  40  48.2  2024  48.7  40  4 
buy yen  118  52  44.1  1926  46.4  55  5 
total  201 92  45.8 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  83  18  21.7  485  11.7  10  1 
buy yen  118  21  17.8  531  12.8  15  2 
total  201 39  19.4 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  83  58  69.9  2509  60.4  50  6 
buy yen  118  73  61.9  2457  59.2  70  6 
total  201 131  65.2 
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TABLE A2.1: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 20 April 1981 to 
29 March 1985 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent  # # 
Observations:  1030 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  1  0  0.0  517  50.2  1  0 
buy marks  24  6  25.0  464  45.0  11  2 
total  25 6  24.0 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  1  0  0.0  118  11.5  0  0 
buy marks  24  7  29.2  146  14.2  3  1 
total  25 7  28.0 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  1  0  0.0  635  61.7  1  0 
buy marks  24  13  54.2  610  59.2  14  3 
total  25 13  52.0 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  1030 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  0  0  na  519  50.4  0  0 
buy yen  11  4  36.4  449  43.6  5  1 
total  11 4  36.4 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  0  0  na  102  9.9  0  0 
buy yen  11  5  45.5  142  13.8  2  1 
total  11 5  45.5 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  0  0  na  621  60.3  0  0 
buy yen  11  9  81.8  591  57.4  6  2 
total  11 9  81.8 
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TABLE A2.2: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 1 April 1985 to 29 
April 1988 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent  # # 
Observations:  805 
Criterion SC1 
sell  marks  33 11  33.3 349 43.4  14  2 
buy  marks  19  8  42.1 421 52.3  10  2 
total  52 19  36.5 
Criterion SC2 
sell  marks  33 11  33.3 132 16.4  5  1 
buy marks  19  4  21.1  80  9.9  2  1 
total  52 15  28.8 
Criterion SC3 
sell  marks  33 22  66.7 481 59.8  20  4 
buy  marks  19 12  63.2 501 62.2  12  3 
total  52 34  65.4 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  805 
Criterion SC1 
sell  yen  52 25  48.1 349 43.4  23  3 
buy  yen  20 10  50.0 412 51.2  10  2 
total  72 35  48.6 
Criterion SC2 
sell  yen  52 10  19.2 111 13.8  7  1 
buy  yen  20 2  10.0 84 10.4  2  0 
total  72 12  16.7 
Criterion SC3 
sell  yen  52 35  67.3 460 57.1  30  4 
buy  yen  20 12  60.0 496 61.6  12  3 
total  72 47  65.3 
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TABLE A2.3: SUCCESS COUNTS FOR U.S. INTERVENTION: 2 May 1988 to 19 
March 1997 
OPENING BID QUOTES 
INTERVENTION VIRTUAL  EXPECTED STANDARD
TOTAL SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES  SUCCESSES DEVIATION 
German Marks   # #  percent  #  percent  # # 
Observations:  2318 
Criterion SC1 
sell marks  44  22  50.0  1121  48.4  21  3 
buy marks  111  54  48.6  1100  47.5  53  5 
total  155 76  49.0 
Criterion SC2 
sell marks  44  6  13.6  274  11.8  5  1 
buy marks  111  17  15.3  305  13.2  15  1 
total  155 23  14.8 
Criterion SC3 
sell marks  44  28  63.6  1395  60.2  26  4 
buy marks  111  71  64.0  1405  60.6  67  6 
total  155 99  63.9 
Japanese Yen  
Observations:  2317 
Criterion SC1 
sell yen  31  15  48.4  1156  49.9  15  3 
buy yen  87  38  43.7  1064  45.9  40  4 
total  118 53  44.9 
Criterion SC2 
sell yen  31  8  25.8  272  11.7  4  1 
buy yen  87  14  16.1  305  13.2  11  1 
total  118 22  18.6 
Criterion SC3 
sell yen  31  23  74.2  1428  61.6  19  4 
buy yen  87  52  59.8  1369  59.1  51  5 
total  118 75  63.6  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
 
1  If a country is in a liquidity trap and long-term domestic government securities—the traditional vehicles 
of quantitative easing —are perfect substitutes for base or in short supply, then conducting open-market operations 
through foreign exchange (and other types of assets) may be advisable (see McCallum 2003).   
2  Edison (1993), Alkeminders (1995), Baillie, Humpage and Osterberg (2000), and Sarno and Taylor 
(2001) provide excellent surveys of intervention.  Nealy (2005) also touches on some econometric issues.   
3  The portfolio balance mechanism also assumes that no restrictions exist on cross-border financial flows 
and that Ricardian equivalence does not hold.   
4  Most models assume that relative changes in the stock of securities leave interest rates unaffected 
because monetary policy determines interest rates.   This need not be the case.   
5  The United States conducts most U.S. interventions, by far, in the New York market, but has on occasion 
placed orders through correspondents in both the European and Far Eastern markets.  We cannot isolate these 
transactions.    
6  The United States did not abruptly end its intervention on 19 March 1997.  U.S. interventions began to 
taper off in the early 1990s.  After August 1995, the United States intervened against Japanese yen on 17 June 1998, 
against euros on 22 September 2000, and again against Japanese yen on 18 March 2011.  These last three 
interventions are the only instances of U.S. intervention during the floating exchange rate era not included in our 
analysis.  Our exchange-rate data determined our sample, which ends on 19 March 1997.   
7  The United States intervened against some other European currencies during the 1970s and early 1980s, 
but data on these currencies are not available.   
8  An appendix in the working paper version of this paper contains the detailed data that we used to 
construct table 2.   
9  Bordo, Humpage and Schwartz (2010a) provide a detailed discussion of intervention during prior to 
1981.   